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INTRODUCTION 
Comparative ethics and the crucible of war 
G. Scott Davis 
Michael Howard takes the title of his recent essay, The Invention of Peace, from 
the nineteenth-century jurist and historian of comparative law Henry Maine, who 
wrote that "war appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modem invention."' 
We modems tend to assume that the great wars of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were aberrant eruptions marring the peaceful status quo, but the opposite 
better describes the long view. Outside the Garden of Eden, human communities 
have always been involved in political conflict and that conflict has regularly 
escalated to the use of lethal force, both within the community and between com-
munities. The ways in which peoples have both justified and constrained the use 
of such force are windows into how they see themselves and the other peoples with 
whom they share, often reluctantly, the world around them. To watch the changes 
that develop in even a single society's understanding of war is to watch that society 
being born and rebom.2 To juxtapose different societies and their distinct ways 
of understanding war, as Clifford Geertz once said of anthropology, is "not to 
answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others, 
guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the 
consultable record of what man has said."3 In this introduction I want to do three 
things. First, I plan to sketch the ways in which the ancient Greeks and their legatees 
discussed the restraint of war. Second, I will provide a sketch of contemporary just 
war thinking. Finally, I want to make some suggestions about comparative ethics 
and the restraint of war. 
From Achilles to Jesus 
The evidence of classical literature makes it seem like the ancient Greeks and 
Romans were obsessed with political violence. Yet "despite the massive concern 
with war in ancient historical writing," writes M. I. Finley, "it is significant that the 
analysis of causation failed to progress much. The 'fruit', Momigliano wrote, that 
Thucydides and his followers reaped 'is not very impressive' ... Roman historians 
were not much better, nor were Plato and Aristotle in their theoretical reflections."4 
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In large measure, Finley suggests, this results from "the 'naturalness' of warfare 
both as a means of acquisition and as one way of achieving other objectives."5 War 
in the abstract stood in no more need of explanation than eating and drinking. The 
shield Hephaestus forges for Achilles in Iliad XVIII depicts two cities. The first 
might seem to be a city at peace, but that is only because there is a procedure for 
adjudicating "the blood-price for a kinsman just murdered."6 Such procedures are 
always unstable and that first city may soon resemble the second, circled by "a 
divided army gleaming in battle-gear, and two plans split their ranks, to plunder the 
city or share the riches with its people. "7 Power and glory are all that matter for real 
heroes. The poem opens with Achilles disgraced and there is no sense that his initial 
wrath is misplaced. It is his refusal to accept Agamemnon's gifts in book IX that 
leads Patroclus to beg for Achilles' armor and thus seal both their fates. Sarpedon, 
son of Zeus yet soon to die by Patroclus's hand, sums up the situation for his 
companion Glaucus: 
Ah my friend, if you and I could escape this fray and live forever, never a 
trace of age, immortal, I would never fight on the front lines again or 
command you to the field where men win fame. But now, as it is, the fates 
of death await us, thousands poised to strike, and not a man alive can 
flee them or escape- so in we go for attack! Give our enemy glory or win 
it for ourselves.8 
Such is the fate of all warriors. The virtues of Homer's nobility are pride, strength, 
and cunning. The proper exercise of those virtues results in riches and glory. Who 
is the chief commander is a matter of fate. So is the length of a life. To be cut down 
in battle is not something the warrior can always avoid, but as long as he fights 
the good fight he has lived the good life. 
Homer provides portraits of the despicable on both sides. Thersites is "insub-
ordinate," the "ugliest man who ever came to Troy ... taunting the king with strings 
of cutting insults" and when Odysseus has had enough he whacks him with the 
speaker's scepter and Thersites "squatted low, cringing, stunned with pain, blink-
ing like some idiot rubbing his tears off dumbly with a fist. Their morale was low 
but the men laughed now."9 Even more revolting is the Trojan Dolon, whose fear 
for his life leads him to betray his own people. Diomedes and Odysseus milk 
him for as much information as they need, then, ')ust as Dolon reached up for his 
chin to cling with a frantic hand and beg for life, Diomedes struck him square across 
the neck- a flashing hack of the sword - both tendons snapped and the shrieking 
head went tumbling in the dust."10 Better to be Sarpedon dead than Dol on alive. 
The moral world of Homer is one where commoners and their worries don't 
count for much. If they misbehave, as do the women of Odysseus' house, they can 
be disposed of without a second thought. 11 But before Odysseus returns to reclaim 
his house and wife, and to dispatch the suitors and their sluts, he catalogs a set of 
"alternative life styles," none of which is worthy of a warrior. It frequently surprises 
students how little a role Odysseus' famous wanderings play in Homer's epic: four 
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out of24 books; 75 pages in Fagles's translation, which runs to almost 500. In many 
ways the Lotus-eaters are the scariest of all: 
who had no notion of killing my companions, not at all, they simply gave 
them the lotus to taste instead ... Any crewmen who ate the lotus, the 
honey-sweet fruit, lost all desire to send a message back, much less return, 
their only wish to linger there with the Lotus-eaters, grazing on lotus, all 
memory of the journey home dissolved forever. 12 
"Grazing" is the operative word here. Humans eat, drink, and tell tales; livestock 
grazes. It is the hope of returning to genuinely human life that keeps him going. 
From Homer to Thucydides we jump at least 300 years into an entirely different 
moral world: no more superheroes and demi-gods. What prompts the Peloponnesian 
War are fears about the balance ofpower. 13 But, as Yvon Garlan notes, the wars 
of the Greeks and Romans, early and late, were hedged round with rules guaranteed 
by the gods. "The ancients," he writes, "could not imagine a true war that was not 
limited in time by declarations, agreements, and symbolic acts."14 For Greeks and 
Romans war displays a "sacral rhythm" which moves from the sacred precincts to 
the councils of the people to a solemn declaration, all under the aegis of the gods. 
Wars were interrupted "to observe a sacred truce during the great panhellenic 
festivals." 15 Wars were ended by solemn oaths guaranteed by the gods. The political 
order "was converted into a three-sided contract by the intervention of sacred 
powers."16 
The laws of war were also guaranteed by the gods. Anything dedicated to them 
was absolutely immune for attack. Not only the priests of the temples, but everything 
"which belonged to the gods (sanctuaries, temples, altars, wealth, flocks and lands) 
or fell under their protection (tombs, certain types of monuments, sometimes 
even entire towns)" was out ofbounds, at least in theory; "men sometimes forgot 
the terrible punishment meted out to Ajax by Athena for having brutally tom the 
prophetess Cassandra from her Trojan temple."17 Ambassadors, because they 
were traditionally priests, were immune. Duty required that battle be followed 
immediately by the burial of the dead. In early times, according to Garlan, trophies 
were dedicated to the gods, though by the time of the Empire they had become 
symbols of personal glory. 18 
Such was the situation when the Romans became the lords of the Mediterranean. 
Even at the time of Jesus the Romans, with their punctilious commitment to the 
demands of law, couched war in ritual context. A generation or two ago it was 
common to think that early Christianity "condemned warfare and military service 
on grounds that were essentially 'pacifist. "'19 Hunter surveys a number of volumes 
that have changed the perspective on military service. John Helgeland's studies 
of the Roman army suggest that Christians had been serving in the army since at 
least the middle of the second century.20 Origen's apology, while insisting that 
Christians may not serve, explains this as a function not of a general Christian 
pacifism, but of their religious vocation. "If Celsus wishes us to be generals," he 
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writes, "let him realize that we do this ... Our prayers are made in secret in the mind 
itself, and are sent up as from priests on behalf of the people in our country."21 
Ambrose and Augustine, writing after the conversion of the emperors, theo-
logically ratify a situation that had been uncertain since the persecutions under 
Diocletian in the late third and early fourth centuries. In letter 189 to Boniface, 
military governor of Numidia, Augustine exhorts him not to "think that no one 
who serves as a soldier, using arms for warfare, can be acceptable to God."22 
Augustine goes on to enumerate the devout soldiers of the New Testament and to 
explain that Christian soldiers "don't seek peace in order to stir up war; no- war is 
waged in order to obtain peace." Furthermore, "it ought to be necessity, and not 
your will, that destroys an enemy who is fighting you. And just as you use force 
against the rebel or opponent, so you ought now to use mercy towards the defeated 
and the captive."23 Augustine had elaborated his view of war as a tragic necessity, 
inevitable given human sinfulness, in his Contra Faustum of 398. A few years 
before his death, in the famous book XIX of his City of God, he repeats it. The real 
evils of war are the vices that motivate human beings to anti-social behavior. 
All that the soldier can do is serve in good conscience, abjuring hate and blood lust, 
to subdue disturbers of the peace and preserve the fragile order that is all we can 
manage in our earthly pilgrimage.24 Charlemagne had the works of Augustine read 
to him at meals. 25 
The Christian church on peace and war, 975-1274 
The legacy of late antiquity and the Patristic age, with regard to war as with so 
much else, was deeply ambiguous. Priests and monks were themselves understood 
in military terms. As Richard Southern puts it: 
The monks fought battles quite as real, and more important, than the battles 
of the natural world; they fought to cleanse the land from supernatural 
enemies. To say that they prayed for the well-being of the king and king-
dom is to put the matter altogether too feebly. They fought as a disciplined 
elite, and the safety of the kingdom depended on their efforts.26 
The year 975 is generally taken to mark the opening of the "peace of God" move-
ment in tenth-century France. In part this seems to have been a practical movement 
to bring sanctions against robbers and thieves who plundered both the church and 
the common people. At the same time, it was an early step in the emerging reform 
movement, attempting to establish at least the basic parameters within which 
citizens of the earthly city could pursue their vocation as "sons of peace."27 
The peace of God movement led directly into the "truce of God," which attempted 
to legislate those days of the week and year during which force of any kind could 
be employed. Here also, vows were made in public assembly, in the presence of 
relics of the saints, thereby invoking divine authority and sanction against all who 
might threaten the truce. There seems to have been widespread popular support for 
the notion that God and the saints would stand up for the weak against the predations 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
of the strong. The social consequence of the peace, however, was to protect church 
land and to place the lesser nobles directly under the authority of the greater. It is 
not impossible that the result was greater peace, in the sense of order, but this came 
at the expense of the freedom of the common people.28 
On 27 November 1095, at Clermont, Pope Urban II exhorted those who had 
broken the peace to become soldiers of Christ, pledged to retake the Holy Land 
from the Turks.29 The various local peaces were extended throughout France, 
whence the leadership was expected to come, and bands of pilgrim soldiers for 
God began to move east in the spring of 1096. It is unlikely that there was anything 
like a theory of crusading at the end of the eleventh century. After the crusaders 
managed to capture Jerusalem, in July of 1099, many tried to explain, and thereby 
justify, the success of the First Crusade. The available paradigms for war in the 
service of God were those of the Hebrew Bible. The crusaders were like the children 
of Israel, led out of Egypt to establish a holy kingdom and to rid the land of the 
enemies of God. But unlike the ancient Israelites, the followers of Christ had a duty 
to protect the land where he died for their salvation, in particular to place the Holy 
Sepulcher in Jerusalem firmly in the hands of Christ's followers. 
The distinction between just war and holy war, of which the crusade is supposedly 
the prime example, is more trouble than it was ever worth.30 Wars of self-defense, 
or to recover property, were clearly just. Wars of expansion and enrichment were 
suspect, though their ends might make them more credible and an upright authority 
might guarantee their character. To be authorized and guided by God, as the 
early interpreters of the crusades held those enterprises to be, could not be any-
thing but just. But whether there could be such a war in a post-biblical epoch was 
another matter. "To Anselm, or to Peter Damian," writes Richard Southern, "the 
crusade made no appeal." He goes on to cite Anselm's exhortation to "abandon 
that Jerusalem that is now not a vision of peace but tribulation."31 But the 
contemporary Song of Roland portrayed upright churchmen winning personal glory 
in the fight against the heathens. Clergy carrying arms was dubiously legal, though 
some did.32 In any event, the clergy on crusade thought their enterprise a just 
one and prayed God for its success and the success of the various lords they served. 
This was generally not thought in any way in tension with the demands of Christian 
vocation. 
Since the land was, so to speak, bought and paid for with the blood of the 
Redeemer, the crusade differed from the wars of the biblical Judges in being 
a reassertion of divine right. Mere possession did not constitute a legitimate holding, 
despite the long hiatus between Muslim control and the mounting of the crusade. 
The crusaders's goal was liberation, not only of the Holy Sepulcher, but of those 
Christians, pilgrims and natives, who had been abused by unbelievers. From the 
French perspective, the First Crusade stood in the tradition of justice derived from 
the Roman tradition and the writings of the Latin fathers, notably Augustine.33 
Criticism of the crusades emerged particularly in the wake of the failed Second 
Crusade, preached by St. Bernard in 1146. But such criticism as there was seems 
rarely to have been directed against the idea of war itself. Individual failures might 
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be seen as trials sent from God or as punishments for sin. 34 This was the judgment 
of Bernard himself and became the standard response to setback in the subsequent 
centuries. Later criticism was directed against particular crusaders or clerics who 
abused their power for personal gain, but here again, few seemed to impugn the 
idea.35 
In March of 1272, Pope Gregory X called a council at Lyons for May of 1274. 
He solicited briefs on three issues: the prospects for a renewed crusade, relations 
with the Greek church, and the need for church reform. Humbert of Romans, past 
master general of the Dominicans, responded with his Opera Tripartitum.36 For 
Humbert, most of the reasons given for rejecting a crusade stem from sinful self-
indulgence or unbelief. Arguments that the crusade is not compatible with Christian 
peacefulness he meets with what had become standard responses. The Muslims 
are actively persecuting Christians, some of whom convert to avoid mishap. The 
land really belongs to Christ and his followers, from whom it was unjustly taken 
six hundred years earlier. Thus genuine knights of Christ should welcome the 
opportunity to enter into battle, not only for the sake of Christ, but to accumulate 
the divine blessing that will open the way to paradise. Not only that, but a Christian 
defeat of the Muslims might hurry them on the way to conversion, demonstrating 
that there is no aid to be found in Muhammad. Thus war would be an act of charity 
directed toward non-believers. Should the crusader be enriched by the way, that 
was no harm. 37 
Thomas Aquinas and the just war tradition 
All the advocates of crusade, whether it was crusade to the east or against European 
heretics, perceived the endeavor as just. What we call the just war tradition is 
an attempt to clarify the conditions which must be met for a war to be fought in good 
conscience. What makes the achievement of Aquinas so impressive is that his 
account of war and the use of force generally is informed by a systematic moral 
psychology and account of the virtues based on the work of Aristotle. 
Thomas's older contemporaries tended to rely more on the traditional Augustinian 
arguments. For Thomas, the human being is born into a social context and dependent 
on that local community for being trained up into the practical and intellectual 
virtues. If the individual is lucky enough to be born into a Christian community, the 
cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice will be informed 
by the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The human act moves from 
the excitation of the appetites by physical stimulus, to the contemplation of an 
action. If the act in question meets the conditions of virtue, then the inner act of will 
initiates the outward action in pursuit of the good in question. That external forces 
or limits may frustrate the act is sometimes fortunate and sometimes tragic, but our 
judgment of the individual depends on the kinds of acts he or she characteristically 
wills and pursues.38 
This general account becomes specific in the second part of the second part 
of Thomas's Summa Theologiae, which discusses the details of Christian life in 
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terms of the theological and cardinal virtues. The account of war comes in the 
discussion of charity, specifically of those vices that are contrary to charity.39 Hatred, 
apathy, and envy may each, in its way, subvert charity. When concern for self 
leads to the neglect ofthe neighbor's good you have discord, and discord gives rise 
to contentiousness. As sides form there is the prospect of schism, a specific form 
of prideful contentiousness that puts the spiritual well-being of the community in 
jeopardy. This leads to the possibility of war. 
When Thomas turns to war he presupposes the larger moral theory already laid 
out, so when he says that war can, in theory, be just he means that it is the sort 
of action that can be praiseworthy when, to paraphrase Aristotle, it is undertaken 
by the right people, for the right reasons, and in the right way. This doesn't mean 
that war is desirable in itself, which would be absurd, or that any war always 
manages to meet the conditions of justice. In fact, given the perverseness of the 
fallen human will, it is reasonable to assume that even a war that was in principle 
just would be fraught with instances of self-serving and vice. The crusader chron-
icles are awash in murderous bloodletting, not least the accounts of the sack 
of Constantinople in 1204. Aquinas is not denying or making light of these facts. 
He is, rather, asking whether and under what conditions sinful humanity can resort 
to armed force. 
The answer is that resort to force is just when it meets three conditions. First, war 
can only be undertaken as a public act, under the aegis of whatever public authority 
is duly constituted to provide for the common good. Private use of organized force 
is always illicit. Mob violence, vigilante "justice," feuds, and the like are inherently 
vicious and could, in any event, not properly be called war. As always, of course, 
there are likely to be grey areas, a fact that would have been most clear to medieval 
people. So, while there might be no properly constituted authority with the power 
to raise an army, invasion by Viking or Mongol might lead to the spontaneous 
formation of a militia, a perfectly legitimate move to protect the common good at 
short notice. 
There must, furthermore, be a just cause to enter into war. Thomas explicates this 
as "those who are attacked are attacked because they deserve it on account of some 
wrong they have done." This admits of two interpretations, only one of which is 
consonant with Aquinas's account of political authority. On the one hand, it might 
appear that anyone who commits a malicious act subjects himself to correction. 
This would seem to lay a foundation for crusading, given the view that the Muslims 
ofthe Holy Land wrested the territory from its previous, Christian, rulers by force. 
Such a view would seem to be justified when Thomas quotes Augustine's descrip-
tion of "a just war as one that avenges wrongs, that is, when a nation or state has 
to be punished either for refusing to make amends for outrages done by its subjects, 
or to restore what it has seized injuriously." Not only that, but Thomas has earlier 
written, seemingly with approval, that Christians wage war with unbelievers to 
prevent them from hindering the practice of the faith.40 
On the other hand, the authority of the ruler derives from human law. The purpose 
oflaw is to constrain the wayward and disorderly, essentially a supplement to the 
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education that the more virtuous received from their parents.41 This constraint 
extends only to external acts that threaten the peace and public order. Unlike the 
natural law, the laws of particular human communities, indeed the communities 
themselves, are fleeting and changeable. Their authority extends primarily to the 
acts of their citizens and only secondarily to events removed in time and place. 
Thus, without saying so directly, Thomas rejects both the original exhortation to 
crusade put forward by Urban II and the reassertion of those justifications by his 
brother Humbert. 
The third condition for a just war, that "the right intention of those waging war 
is required, that is, they must intend to promote the good and to avoid evil,"42 raises 
the barrier still higher. Not only must the wrong be one directed at a particular 
human community, over which the proponent of war has jurisdiction, but the 
enterprise must be directed toward rectifying a particular evil, without employ-
ing any wicked means. Thomas's justification of crusading, then, only extends 
to those Christians who are themselves being oppressed for the practice or preaching 
of their faith. 
In context, this was no negligible constraint. There had, through the eleventh 
century, been a steady stream of pilgrims from Europe to Jerusalem, which flow 
was only in part curtailed by the crusades. The indigenous Christian communities 
of the eastern Mediterranean had suffered little at Muslim hands, even after the 
onset of the crusades. In fact, in the decades just before the arrival of the crusaders, 
the non-orthodox Christians of Anatolia had backed the emerging Seljuk Turks 
as a welcome relief from the oppression of the Byzantines.43 In 1229 the aspir-
ing emperor Frederick II negotiated a truce with the sultan, guaranteeing Christian 
freedom of worship throughout Syria, for which he was roundly excoriated by 
the Christian patriarch of Jerusalem. After the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 
1258 the Christians were in better shape than the Sunni Muslims, owing to the 
fact that the new ruler's wife was a Nestorian Christian. Another Dominican 
respondent to Gregory X's call for briefs, William of Tripoli, reported that the 
indigenous Christians disapproved of the crusades as an impediment to good 
business.44 In short, while war against unbelievers was in theory supportable, 
the facts argued against it. For Thomas, judgment and action always take place 
in specific contexts and if all the conditions for right action are not met, the act is 
defective.45 
Thomas's three conditions for jus ad bellum (justice in going to war) lie at the 
heart of subsequent just war thinking. The remaining ad bellum criteria - pro-
portionality of war to injury, last resort, and reasonable hope of success- are simply 
demands of prudence. Anyone who would undertake war in the absence of such 
conditions would by that very fact convict himself of malicious belligerence. But 
it remains to consider the restraints that must be observed in prosecuting a 
war, what came to be called the jus in bello criteria for maintaining a just war. Here 
again it is important to recall that all the conditions must be met for a war to be 
just and defect at any point renders the enterprise blameworthy. So in considering 
whether subterfuge and ambush are legitimate tactics in war, Thomas notes that 
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there is a distinction between lying or promise-breaking and concealment. The 
first sort of deception requires the deliberate use of wicked means and is never 
acceptable. Concealment, on the other hand, is a legitimate dictate of prudence. 
Wicked means may never be used in any circumstances. This includes targeting 
the innocent to achieve a military objective. Thomas makes a clear distinction 
between private and public persons in noting that "if a private person uses the sword 
by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or if a public person uses it through zeal 
for justice ... then he himself does not 'draw the sword', but is commissioned by 
another to use it, and does not deserve punishment. "46 The logic of the argument is 
clear. A sovereign is commissioned by the people to pursue and protect the common 
good. Those in authority may, in tum, commission previously private individuals 
to use deadly force on behalf of the public. By being incorporated into a public 
instrument private persons become part of a whole. So when the soldier attacks 
another soldier, he acts legitimately and the killing is not malicious. This is true 
even if the jus ad bellum criteria are not met; it does not lie within the authority 
of the individual soldier to determine whether or not there is just cause, right intent, 
and the like. Unless an order or tactic is manifestly unjust the soldier may, in good 
conscience, follow orders. The defect in the action falls on the head of the com-
manderY Soldiers, then, can only kill other soldiers. The army is the instrument 
with which the aggressor inflicts his injury and the instrument by which the aggres-
sion is repulsed. In later work this will come to be known as the in bello criterion 
of"discrimination," which condemns any attack on non-combatants. 
Of course, it would be absurd to pretend that wars take place without civilian 
casualties, even in the more restricted context of medieval warfare. In his discussion 
of self-defense Thomas elaborates what comes to be called the principle of"double 
effect." This much misinterpreted principle is not intended by Aquinas as the 
introduction of some arcane, much less arbitrary, theoretical justification for doing 
evil. He is, rather, making explicit something that is generally taken for granted 
when we assign responsibility. "A single act," he writes, "may have two effects, 
of which one alone is intended, whilst the other is incidental to that intention."48 
Consider, for example, any competition for an academic position. One graduate 
student may know that a friend is competing for the same job, but as long as she 
behaves honestly and in good faith, she deserves no blame if she succeeds. By 
extension, when the private person resists his attacker with reasonable force there 
is no malice, even if the attacker dies._ 
Soldiers using otherwise legitimate means, particularly in modem warfare 
(though even medieval archers often missed the mark), should realize that non-
combatants in proximity to the fighting run a risk of injury. Therefore they must use 
their weapons in ways that discriminate between legitimate objects: combatants, 
their weapons, and the materials that make aggression possible. When soldiers fire 
at legitimate targets, with reasonable weapons, and hit civilian bystanders, it is 
tragic but not culpable.49 1t is no counter-argument that what is reasonable is often 
a matter of judgment. We exercise the virtues of prudence, justice, and courage to 
determine where to draw the line. Thomas's Aristotelianism is not designed 
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to eliminate judgment but to clarifY it. Nor is it relevant that people lie or dissemble 
about their real intentions. The fact remains, if known only to God. 
Aquinas was on his way to attend Gregory's council at Lyons when he died, in 
March of 1274. He had apparently intended to address the issue of Latin-Greek 
relations, since he was travelling with a copy ofhisAgainst the Errors of the Greeks, 
composed a decade earlier. There is no way to be sure what he might have said on 
Gregory's proposed crusade. But his account of the ethics ofwar rapidly became 
the benchmark discussion. No previous author so fully integrated the problem 
of war into a comprehensive moral psychology and political theory. Virtuous 
people make reasonable laws to facilitate the business of the commonwealth. All 
are essential, but first among equals is virtue, which is essential to making good laws 
and pursuing the right sort ofbusiness. The account provided by Aquinas remained 
the standard for the next 300 years. 50 
From the death of Aquinas to the Second Scholastic 
The most notable event in the subsequent century was the appearance of the first 
independent legal treatise on war, that of John ofLegnano, who taught both civil 
and canon law at the University ofBologna from the 1350s until his death in 1383,51 
While students oflaw had addressed issues of war from Gratian on, the discussions 
are generally jumbled and philosophically unstructured. Thomas Aquinas was 
particularly dismissive of the authority of lawyers. But the concerns of lawyers 
are of necessity the concerns of the society and a look at John of Legnano is an 
entry into a new vocabulary emerging in the later Middle Ages. The first thing to 
remark is the very wide scope John gives to the concept of war. There is, to begin, 
a distinction between spiritual and corporeal war. Spiritual war at the celestial level 
seems to be the struggle of the individual against the limit placed and judgment 
passed on human life by God. At the human level, spiritual war reflects the Pauline 
struggle between the law of God and the law operative in the body. 52 Corporeal 
war comprises not only what Thomas means by war- which John calls "universal 
corporeal war"- but the conflicts of individuals that result in reprisals and duels. 
Though John cites Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas in those chapters where he 
talks about virtue, courage, and justice in general, questions oflegal authority and 
obedience dominate the work. Following the discussion of mercenaries, for 
example, is the question "whether those who die in war are saved?"53 The answer 
is that those who die in war for the Church are saved, while those who die in another 
sort of lawful war are saved only on condition that they are without mortal sin. 
"But if they fall in an unlawful war," he insists, "though that be their only mortal 
sin, they perish." Thus to have a legal obligation to a lord may be morally binding, 
on pain of loss of livelihood, while to venture forth, if the war is unlawful, may 
jeopardize eternal life. The disparate legal judgments, from differing times and 
places, often leave it unclear how to resolve whether or not an action is lawful 
and who is bound by it, morally or legally. So when John asks "whether a vassal is 
bound to help his lord against his father, or a father against his son?" several texts 
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seem to say that the feudal oath takes precedent while another gloss "somewhat 
inclines to the contrary view." John concludes, not very helpfully, that "I should 
think that the quality of the assistance to be rendered should be considered."54 
For Thomas, human law should be in the service of the common good, pursued 
in accord with the virtues. Any obligation must be analyzed in the context of justice 
and the common good. What the son owes to the father in virtue of his gift of life, 
nurture, and stewardship can never, for Aquinas, following Aristotle, be repaid. 
It is only if the father were to become vicious and inimical to the common good that 
the son could ever be required to take sides against him and then only if the son 
had a public role like that of a policeman. This should not be taken to imply that all 
issues can be resolved independent of the law. Any extended human community 
will require some body of law to negotiate day-to-day existence and some judicial 
body to consider findings of fact in the light of that law. The point is only that 
the law does not float free of the community's pursuit of the common good. When 
justice seems to be at odds with the letter of the law, the virtuous judge exercises 
equity to maintain our collective commitment to justice and the common good. 55 
Contrast this with John's account of dueling. On his usage the duel is a "particular 
war," specifically "a corporeal fight between two persons, deliberate on both sides, 
designed for compurgation, glory, or exaggeration ofhatred."56 All such endeavors 
would clearly violate Thomas's rejection of brawling and private killing. Even 
the duel of compurgation, by which John means the lex duellorum, a duel to vin-
dicate one's position before a court oflaw, is explicitly ruled out. For while it may 
take place as a public proceeding under the rules of a court of law, it is a form of 
divination and improperly involves demanding a judgment from God. 57 Thus the 
fact that the Lombard law permited such duels in 20 cases is inconsequential and 
John's discussion of champions, the organization of the duel, and who should strike 
first ( cf. chaps. 17 6-194 ), for instance, are of merely antiquarian interest. 58 
The rise of the lawyers did not signal the end of theological treatment of war. 
In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Thomas is not the only 
theological authority invoked in discussing war. In the Question at Vespers of 1512, 
Jacques Almain writes rather baldly that "Scotus's assertion in question 3 of 
distinction 15 [of his commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences] is quite false, 
that it is not legitimate for anyone whatever to kill by public authority other than 
in the cases excepted by God from the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill.' "59 
The implication is that, at least for the _purposes of disputation, there is a tradition 
of invoking John Duns Scotus against the just war arguments of Aquinas. In his 
discussion of the Decalogue, Scotus argues that the sixth commandment, along 
with the rest of the second tablet, is not properly speaking part of the natural law. 
From this it would seem to follow that once the commandment is issued it must be 
understood as direct divine legislation, which remains binding unless and until there 
is a dispensation issued by God. The implication is that this extends to all killing, 
including wars of self-defense and the execution of criminals. 60 
Against this Almain invokes Aquinas explicitly for the legitimacy of excising the 
diseased part and thus, by analogy, for the praiseworthiness ofkilling the dangerous 
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criminal. Furthermore, the community acts in accord with practical reason when it 
delegates this authority to the prince, who acts to protect the common good. Almain 
insists that, while the delegation of authority is positive, Thomas is right to say 
that it is natural for human beings to form communities and that it accords with 
practical reason to create things like police forces and armies. Since these various 
forces are ordered to a specific, communal end, they await no direct command, even 
that of God, for their reasonable use. 
The pre-eminence of St. Thomas in moral theology was an explicit tenet of the 
movement known as the "Second Scholastic" and associated with a group of 
Parisian trained Spanish Dominicans a bit younger than Almain. The best known 
are Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo de Soto. Vitoria and Soto were both active 
critics of Spanish practice and policy in the recently discovered New World. It 
is, in fact, for his Inquiry on the Indians that Vitoria remains the most widely known 
and widely read figure of the Second Scholastic. Following Thomas, Vitoria begins 
by noting that there is some doubt as to the propriety of Spanish conduct in the 
newly discovered lands and that in such cases neither the royal counsellors nor 
lawyers are competent to judge a case which rightly falls to the moral theologian. 61 
Vitoria reviews the possible titles that Spain might have to dominion in the New 
World and finds them wanting, concluding that, in the main, Spanish treatment 
of the New World natives has been illicit and immoral. Neither the king nor the 
pope is a universal sovereign. Given the existence of recognizable indigenous com-
munities, the representatives of the king had no authority to intervene in their 
lives or appropriate their properties. Adventurers such as the brothers Pizarro, whose 
depredations were manifestly vicious, should be strongly sanctioned by the king 
and his ministers and Vitoria even suggested, though only in oblique terms, that 
reparations might be in order. 62 
Vitoria follows Thomas in insisting that, while the Spaniards have in principle 
a right to preach the Gospel, and that the natives incur mortal sin in failing to 
believe, this sin is wholly intelligible given the context and does not license any 
war by the Spaniards. If they must resort to arms in self-defense, that force should 
extend only to their protection and if they succeed in suppressing an attack they 
are still not allowed to carry war to the natives. Nor is it just to despoil them or to 
place them in servitude, even were the intent to make them more receptive to the 
Gospel. There is no justice in conversion by the sword.63 
In the 1540s the humanist and royal chronicler Juan Gines de Sepulveda invoked 
the Aristotelian doctrine of "natural slavery" to claim that the Spanish conquests 
were just. Sepulveda argued that the native Americans lived a life so crude and 
lacking in the basic amenities of civilization that it was an act of Aristotelian justice 
and Christian charity to subdue them to a higher civilizing force. The Dominican 
Bartolome de Las Casas, who had long been active in the native cause, objected 
strenuously and succeeded in having Sepulveda's book suppressed in Spain. Soto, 
who convened the conference on publishing the volume, summarized the competing 
arguments and shortly thereafter, in his work on justice, not only reiterated the 
position of Vitoria, but pointed out that even the least sophisticated among 
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the Indians was no more a natural slave than the peasants and simple-minded of 
Spain itself, whom nobody thought could rightfully be enslaved.64 In their 
discussions of Spanish injustice in the New World, Vitoria and Soto displayed the 
practical applicability of just war thinking as formulated by Thomas Aquinas. While 
recognizing the importance oflegal issues, those findings were clearly subordinate 
to those of moral theology. 
The triumph of the lawyers 
The legal and moral traditions proceeded in parallel for the next 250 years, but more 
and more the just war tradition of Aquinas and the Second Scholastic came to be 
identified with Catholic Orthodoxy and to be replaced, when questions of justice 
came up at all, by the legal paradigm as developed by the Dutch humanist Hugo 
Grotius. Grotius dutifully acknowledges the work of Aquinas and Vitoria, but it is 
a mistake to locate his work in their tradition. First, he reflects the anti-Aristotelian 
tum of the humanist tradition. Grotius's anti-Aristotelian program comes out clearly 
in The Law of War and Peace, which first appeared in 1625.65 There he writes 
that Aristotle's supremacy in the intellectual world has been so tyrannical "that 
Truth, to whom Aristotle devoted faithful service, was by no instrumentality more 
repressed than by Aristotle's name!"66 The source of his anti-Aristotelianism is 
not altogether clear, but the result is the traditional lawyerly goal of reducing 
the exercise of prudence and equity in favor of a strict deduction of application 
from law. By eliminating the Aristotelian appeal to the virtues it is much easier 
to put forward "the humanist tradition, which applauded warfare in the interests 
of one's respublica, and saw a dramatic moral difference between Christian, 
European civilization and barbarism."67 
Grotius's earlier volume, De Jure Praedae, shows him doing something quite 
new when compared to Vitoria. He combines the Stoic account of human nature 
with a lawyerly desire to see ethics in terms of a hierarchy of laws, rules, and 
principles governing the exchange of goods in an orderly social machine. From the 
Stoics Grotius takes the notion that God's will is the law and that it is expressed 
in the design of creation. Central to all animals, including humans, is the urge to 
self-preservation. Humans are also endowed with reason and an inclination to 
sociability. "We are born," he writes, "for a life offellowship."68 So we are impelled 
by nature toward the creation of a social order. At the same time, nature demands 
that we take whatever means are necessary to maintain our security. The result 
is that we contract with our fellows to establish a system oflaws and the instruments 
for their enforcement. Grotius elaborates a legal structure of nine rules and 13 laws 
from which, he maintains, various theses and their corollaries may be shown to 
follow.69 
Specifically, Grotius hopes to justify the recent Dutch seizure of a Portuguese 
vessel. Because evil deeds must be corrected, the good pursued, and the care of 
the common good maintained by all citizens, "a private war is undertaken justly in 
so far as judicial recourse is lacking."70 Because the Spanish have, for a sustained 
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period of time, injured the interests of the Dutch generally and because the Spanish 
cannot be brought to cease from their abuses, it is legitimate that prizes should be 
taken when possible.71 Thus, this particular prize is legitimate and the Dutch should 
"defend the right of commerce against every possible injury."72 
Turning, in his Law of War and Peace, to the indigenous peoples of the non-
Christian world, Grotius rejects the arguments ofVitoria and Soto: 
Regarding such barbarians, wild beasts rather than men, one may rightly 
say what Aristotle wrongly said of the Persians ... that war against them 
was sanctioned by nature; and what !socrates said, in his Panathenaic 
Oration, that the most just war is against savage beasts, the next against 
men who are like beasts. 
(1925: II, 40) 
This is doubly appropriate when such barbarians violate the natural law, for "they 
[Vitoria et al.] claim that the power of punishing is the proper effect of civil 
jurisdiction while we hold that it also is derived from the law ofnature.73 Grotius 
may use the language of Aquinas and his Spanish followers, but it is a language that 
has become vastly more permissive than the older school. And it paves the way 
for supposedly liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill to write as if it were obvi-
ous that Africans, Indians east or west, and similarly barbaric peoples must fall 
under western tutelage before they can enjoy the benefits of liberty. Thus Mill, 
writing two and a half centuries after Grotius, can take it as "hardly necessary 
to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of 
their faculties ... Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with 
barbarians."74 
The consolidation of the Westphalian system, the expansions of colonial empire, 
the age of revolution, and the struggle to maintain the balance of power in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries left the classic just war tradition 
in the dust. Questions oflaw and contract, on the one hand, and liberty and nation-
alism, on the other, dominate arguments of rhetoric of the late eighteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries. Serious political thinkers, such as the young Henry Kissinger, 
take as their ideal the practical political machinators of the post-Napoleonic 
era. Kissinger's A World Restored, based on his 1954 Harvard dissertation, main-
tains that "the test of a statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship 
of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends."75 The realism of Kissinger, 
in the history of political thought, is the flip side of John Dewey's idealism. 
War and justice in twentieth-century thought 
In the first half of the twentieth century the natural law approach to the ethics of 
war was dismissed by most American political thinkers. "During the nineteenth 
century," writes John Dewey, "the notion of natural law in morals fell largely 
into discredit and disuse outside the orthodox moralists of the Catholic church ... 
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Even when retained, as in some texts, it was in perfunctory deference to tradition 
rather than as a living intellectual force."76 
The alternative to natural law occupied Dewey for much of his career, particularly 
after the start of the First World War. His German Philosophy and Politics of1915 
is not generally thought one of his most compelling volumes. Nonetheless, Jo 
Ann Boydston writes that, "although in later years this book has been generally 
conceded to be among Dewey's least valuable, reviewers praised it at the time of 
its publication.'m 
One who did not, however, was W. E. Hocking. Dewey, as Hocking rightly reads 
him, sees a direct connection between Kant's categorical imperative and German 
militarism. "Can anyone with the slightest historical justice," asks Hocking 
rhetorically, "credit the German government of to-day with following this 
Kantian principle?" Hocking closes with the accusation that German behavior is, 
in fact, "pragmatic, which is what Realpolitik essentially means."78 Dewey, rather 
obviously irked, responds that "Professor Hocking has not grasped my position."79 
German Philosophy and Politics, while inspired by the European conflict, is a case-
study in moral theory, designed to articulate Dewey's sense "that there are no 
such things as pure ideas of pure reason."80 Ideas are themselves expressions of 
living individuals and communities coming to grips with a concrete situation. When 
the social world is orderly it is not necessary, nor are people ordinarily inclined, 
to reflect in depth on the norms and ideals embodied in social life. In times of 
flux, however, ordinarily stable beliefs and inferences fall into question. War, thus, 
opens a window on the relation between ideas and action. 
Alan Ryan, a sympathetic reader of German Philosophy and Politics, describes 
it as "one of the most striking (though not strikingly persuasive) books Dewey 
ever wrote,"81 and attributes the failure of the argument, at least in part, to the fact 
that Dewey "relied rather too heavily" on the German military theorist Friedrich 
von Bemhardi.82 But this, I think, misses Dewey's point. At the tum of the century 
Bemhardi was in charge of war history for the German General Staff. By 1909 he 
was commanding general of the Seventh Army. His On War Today (of which 
Germany and the Next War is volume two) has been described by Michael Howard 
as "brilliant and heterodox," containing "a great deal of shrewd tactical analysis."83 
The text went through nine editions in the two years before the war and shortly 
after the opening of hostilities the young Walter Lippmann, later to assist in 
formulating Wilson's "fourteen points,"_wrote that "we were all surprised at the war, 
stunned at the idea that such things could happen. And then we took to reading 
Bemhardi ... and we discovered that this war had been a long time in the minds 
of the men who know Europe."84 Whatever the actual motives of individual agents 
in the field, Bemhardi is a Weberian "ideal type," playing the role of Benjamin 
Franklin in Dewey's account of the Kantian ethic and the spirit of militarism. 
Dewey argues that interpreting morality on the model of law, whether it be 
that of the philosopher-king, the Christian god, or the rational intellect, risks turning 
the strategies of a particular time and place into superhumanly established and 
maintained norms. When this illusion becomes the norm it stifles our ability to 
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innovate and experiment with alternative approaches. As in Weber's account of 
the spirit of capitalism, an all-encompassing idea- here Kant's cosmopolitan vision 
of perpetual peace- is transformed into its opposite. War, now, "is to national life 
what the winds are to the sea, 'preserving mankind from the corruption engendered 
by immobility.' "85 
Against "a priorism" Dewey advocates "a radically experimental philosophy,"86 
but he denies the European identification of "Americanism" with "a crude empi-
ricism and a materialistic utilitarianism."87 1t is closer, surprisingly, to the position 
of Burke. What inspires Dewey to identify with Burke is the conservative icon's 
rejection of"metaphysical abstraction" and his insistence on grounding the moral 
life in the contingencies of shared experience. What distinguishes American liberal-
ism from British conservatism is the fact that "America is too new ... we have not 
the requisite background of law, institutions and achieved social organization."88 
Not only that, "but in our internal constitution we are actually interracial and 
international."89 Only with violent internal upheaval could we attain the sort of 
cultural and historical homogeneity that renders Burke's conservatism plausible. 
The moral life of democracy is one that fosters "the fruitful processes of co-
operation in the great experiment ofliving together ... a future in which freedom 
and fullness of human companionship is the aim, and intelligent cooperative 
experimentation is the method."90 Only in the service of these democratic ideals 
is it legitimate to break the peace; only in furtherance of these ideals, Dewey 
ultimately wants to say, can a democratic community enter into the present war. His 
willingness to support the war effort was always predicated on this democratic jus 
ad bellum and he was deeply disappointed with the outcome of the war. Dewey's 
stance against the League of Nations and his involvement with the "outlawry 
of war" movement reflect this disappointment.91 Philosophically, however, it was 
a descent into nonsense. Dewey writes that: 
The Committee for the Outlawry of War had strenuously opposed making 
a distinction between aggressive and defensive wars, point out that 
all nations claimed that their own wars were defensive and holding to the 
idea that it was the institution of war and not particular wars which were 
to be outlawed.92 
At the time he vilified international law as implicated in the "war system. "93 Having 
rejected the just war tradition, Dewey, America's leading public intellectual in the 
first half of the twentieth century, leaves us with a stark contrast between pacifism 
and an aggressive Euro-American will to power. 
Almost a decade later, Dewey reverted to the position he held prior to his outlawry 
of war period. "War with a totalitarian power," he insists, "is war against an 
aggressive way of life that can maintain itself in existence only by constant 
extension of its sphere of aggression. "94 This totalitarian challenge is a direct attack 
on the virtues of democracy. While not to be welcomed, much less sought out, this 
sort of war is part of our democratic commitment "to unceasing effort to break 
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down the walls of class, of unequal opportunity, of color, race, sect, and nationality, 
which estranges human beings from one another."95 When confronted with war the 
pragmatist swings between democratic, then pacifist, then back to democratic 
idealism. 
Ethics and war in a nuclear age: the return 
of the just war tradition 
If ever a day changed everything, it was 6 August 1945. "Little Boy" and "Fat 
Man" were astounding in their economy and their aftermath; but for the Japanese, 
the terror had already become routine. The dropping of the atomic bomb was the 
culmination of six months of firebombing: 
The most careful count, done by the Japanese themselves, produced fewer 
losses than the Americans estimated, but either number is horrific: 240,000 
to 300,000 dead (mostly civilians), approximately 2.5 million homes 
destroyed, and more than 8 million refugees. Of71 Japanese cities, only 
5 escaped substantial damage - and two of these were Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.96 
The firebombing of Japan brought to the Pacific theater tactics that had already 
been roundly condemned in the European. In the Catholic world, the American 
Jesuit John Ford had condemned the firebombing of Germany along lines that 
continued the analysis of Aquinas and the Second Scholastic. "No proportionate 
cause," Ford concluded, "could justify the evil done; and to make it legitimate 
would soon lead the world to the immoral barbarity of total war."97 A few years 
later, the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe protested giving an Oxford 
honorary to Harry Truman on the grounds that he was a mass murderer.98 In 1961, 
Anscombe joined with a distinguished group of British Catholics to train the 
resources of just war thinking on the emerging policy of deterrence by mutually 
assured destruction.99 
In the United States, Catholic moral thought was viewed with suspicion by the 
mostly Protestant mainstream and Dewey's invocation of democratic values hardly 
seemed adequate to deal with the situation. So, at least, it seemed to Paul Ramsey. 
In 1961, he shocked the Protestant establishment by turning away from the 
pragmatic realism of Reinhold Niebuhr and embracing, with some modifications, 
the tradition of Vitoria(J~.amsey recast the just war theory in an Augustinian 
mold, insisting on the centrality of agape, the other regarding love that demands of 
public officials a commitment to the welfare of their neighbors, even if it requires 
the exercise of deadly force. On this version, Aquinas's Aristotelian moral 
psychology is relegated to the background and the just war tradition after Augustine 
becomes a matter of clarifying the principles that inform Christian love of 
neighbor.100 
As opposition to the war in Vietnam gathered momentum, Ramsey and the just 
war tradition generally came to be seen as tools of the right wing establishment. In 
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1977, Michael Walzer published his own reworking of the just war tradition, pitched 
to the social democratic left. Walzer was reacting to his own sense that the anti-war 
movement of the mid-1960s did not have an adequate vocabulary to explain what 
was wrong with the war in Vietnam and what was right about nuclear deterrence. 
Like Ramsey, Walzer had little use for the Aristotelian background of Aquinas 
and the Second Scholastic, identifying himself with a legal paradigm grounded 
in the contractarian tradition of Grotius, Hobbes, and Rousseau. For Walzer, the 
''war convention" stipulates the intuitive ideals for fighting a just war, and we then 
elaborate the modifications of that convention forced on us by the necessities 
of war, culminating in "supreme emergency," which licenses illegal acts in order 
to protect our basic values, but only so long as is necessary to put down the threat 
and restore the rule oflaw. 
However interpreted, the just war criteria have become the starting points, on the 
left and right, for discussing the ethics of war. Advocates and critics of the American 
actions in the first Gulf War agreed that the jus ad bellum requires: 
right authority 
2 just cause 
3 right intention 
4 last resort 
5 reasonable hope of success 
6 proportionality of injury to the consequences ofwar. 101 
Both sides also insisted that the just prosecution of a war satisfy the jus in bello 
demands of: 
discrimination, subject to the reasonable allowance of double effect 
2 proportion, in the sense of limiting damage to the importance of a particular 
action for securing the ends of war. 
These are the minimal conditions for justice. Players on the international stage 
are always at liberty to hold themselves to a higher standard through signing on to 
international treaties and joining international organizations, but such alliances are 
conditional. For just war thinkers, the demands of justice are not. 
Ethics, war, and the perils of comparison 
The twenty-first-century promises to be more multi-cultural than any since 
the advent of modernity, with the voices and vocabularies of many traditions 
demanding to be heard. How these alternative voices shape the thought and practice 
of the next few decades defies prediction, but making a start on grasping those 
vocabularies should not be postponed. Based solely on the history of the western 
just war tradition, the student of comparative ethics ought to recognize that there 
are at least three models, broadly speaking, for understanding ethics: the legal 
paradigm; the virtue, or character, paradigm; and the economic paradigm. 
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The legal paradigm finds it natural to speak oflaw, a lawgiver, and a community 
bound to observe the law. In the western tradition, the oldest continuous version of 
this model is that found in Hebrew Scripture. The creator issues commands, first 
to Adam and Eve, later to Noah and Abraham, and finally to Moses. God has the 
authority to issue these laws because, as creator, he is ultimately the owner of his 
creation. Despite the clear demands of his law, humans continually fail to observe 
them, which typically leads to some sanction. Thus Adam and Eve are expelled 
from the Garden, all but Noah and his family are expunged from creation, Abraham 
is tested and found worthy, and the people oflsrael, despite their apostasy at Sinai, 
receive the 613 commandments of Torah. 
The best critic of ethics as law is Aristotle himself. The Nicomachean Ethics sees 
law as a product of individual societies, seeking to formulate a code of public 
behavior, such as the constitution of Athens, that facilitates the pursuit of what 
the community cares about. Such constitutions presuppose at least a rudimentary 
consensus about the kind of people valued, the kind ofbehavior to be praised and 
blamed, and the sort of polis that should be fostered. For such communities there 
is no need to ask about universal reason; what matters is the shared reasons they 
give each other either for applauding or condemning what goes on among them. The 
character and virtues of both the individuals and the group as a whole are what 
give the law meaning. 
The "economic paradigm" treats ethics along the lines of contracts and exchanges. 
We have seen in Grotius that individuals find themselves under the law, but only 
as a result of an implicit agreement motivated by nature. What the law must acknow-
ledge are the rights, as well as the duties, secured in the initial contract. John Rawls, 
the most important recent contract theorist, argues that to achieve fairness the 
contract must be negotiated, conceptually speaking, from an original position 
where the parties do not know where they will end up in the social order. Once the 
basic structure of justice is in place, goods are negotiated in the public square 
on the basis offairness.102 When it comes to war, Rawls simply identifies himself 
with the contractarian approach ofWalzer. 103 
While Rawls proposes his theory of justice as an alternative to utilitarianism, 
utilitarians such as Peter Singer agree that: 
an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional 
group ... Ethics requires us to go beyond 'I' and 'you' to the universal 
law, the universalisable judgment, the standpoint ofthe impartial spectator 
or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it. 104 
What leads Singer to utilitarianism is the sense that Rawls does not provide credible 
guidance in justifying the ways we balance competing interests to satisfy our 
intuitions about what is best. Utilitarianism, despite its critics, at least gives some 
direction to what counts as the best consequences. Ultimately, right action is a 
matter of balancing aggregate goods over individual evils. When we want to draw 
a line, it becomes, as for Rawls, a matter of negotiating where the attempt to 
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maximize goods must be limited. So, while Singer follows Seneca in seeing 
infanticide as the compassionate solution to "the problem posed by sick and 
deformed babies," he hastens to add that "killing an infant whose parents do not 
want it dead is, of course, an utterly different matter."105 
It would be a mistake to think that comparative ethics is simply a matter of 
attaching these labels to this or that author in this or that tradition. Most traditions 
will display features of all three. Classical Judaism, for example, might be thought 
of as standing foursquare in the legal paradigm, but it is hardly to be divorced from 
the prophetic tradition, calling Israel to be the sort of people God wants them 
to be. At the same time, opening the Mishnah at random will likely confirm the 
importance of rights and fairness in the exercise of the law. For example, at 
Sanhedrin 3.1: "Cases concerning property are decided by three judges. Each suitor 
chooses one and together they choose another. So R. Meir. But the Sages say: The 
two judges choose yet another."106 If there is already this mix of paradigms in 
the foundational text of classical Judaism, we should hardly be surprised if its 
contemporary branches divide up with even greater complexity. No theory or 
method can get around the fact that human acts are always performed in a particular 
time and place and that interpreting those acts requires some entry into language 
and context. 
At the most general level, interpretation is a matter of what Donald Davidson 
calls "triangulation." Imagine two individuals who do not as yet share a language 
encountering each other on the seashore. They may respond to each other in many 
different ways, putting both in possession of three bits of information: his own 
response, the response of the other, and the environment that provokes the response. 
Assuming they have the time and inclination, the two can, by a familiar process of 
backing and forthing, move closer to getting the responses to match up. By itself, 
this sort of triangulation may not be sufficient to identify precisely what the other 
thinks, wants, feels or believes, but it "is necessary if there is to be any answer 
at all to the question what its concepts are concepts of."107 Once their responses are 
regularly predictable they can undertake cooperative actions together. After that, 
it's a gray line where we say the one has learned the other's language. 
Still, as Wittgenstein put it, "one human being can be a complete enigma to 
another." But this doesn't refer to some sort of Cartesian privacy. Rather: 
We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange 
traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's 
language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not 
knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet 
with them. 108 
The source of the problem is not one of radical translation. It lies in the "entirely 
strange traditions." R. C. Zaehner, for example, was a prodigious linguist, but he 
never seems to have felt at home with the rituals of purity and concern for pollution 
evident in the traditions he studied. In his introduction to Zoroastrianism he: 
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omits all account of the elaborate system of taboo worked out in the 
Videvdat ... and maintained down to the present day by the orthodox. 
This I have done because it is of no interest to the general reader and 
because it is the least attractive and the least worthwhile aspect of an 
otherwise attractive religion. 109 
He says similar things about Hinduism in various places. In his sketch of 
Hinduism he refers the reader to the Abbe Dubois's Hindu Manners, Customs, and 
Ceremonies, first published in English in 1816, "as still the most exhaustive 
treatment of a subject scarcely touched on in this book."110 In this Zaehner is simply 
the heir, perhaps odd for a Catholic convert, to a modem "tendency to suppose 
that any ritual is empty form." 111 The result is that Zaehner never learns how the 
language of pollution, ritual, and sacrifice hang together in the life of his subjects. 
As far as day-to-day existence goes, he never finds his feet with them. 112 
Herbert Fingarette's Confucius: The Secular as Sacred transformed the study 
of Confucianism, and comparative religious ethics, by reading the Analects not 
as the "archaic irrelevance" of a "prosaic and parochial moralizer,"113 but as the 
work of a social visionary trying to articulate a way to see Lu and its neighboring 
principalities as a cultural whole, worthy of preservation in a period of warring 
states and social turmoil. Of the three ways, generally speaking, that individuals 
can be brought to cooperate, two- coercion and contract- are inherently unstable. 
By seeing the practices that secure order as "an inheritance through accepted 
tradition,"114 Confucius succeeded in persuading subsequent generations that 
"the dignity peculiar to man and the power associated with this dignity could be 
characterized in terms of holy rite."115 
Fingarette articulates the interrelated vocabulary of ceremony -li,jen, shu, etc. 
- as an alternative to the ethics of law and guilt, or that of utility and contract, 
prevalent in Anglo-American moral theory. While he is committed to the practices, 
and some of the positions, of the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, 116 
Fingarette is profoundly dissatisfied with moral theory done in the: 
language of choice and responsibility as these are intimately intertwined 
with the idea ofthe ontologically ultimate power of the individual to select 
from genuine alternatives to create his own spiritual destiny, and with the 
related ideas of spiritual guilt, 51nd repentance or retribution for such 
guilt." 7 
Whether they used a language like ours or not, the people of ancient China 
faced problems not wholly unlike their contemporaries to the west. "Some men," 
Fingarette remarks, "were more responsible than others in Confucius's day as in 
ours. It is also obvious that men made choices in ancient China."118 The point 
is to see how other people thought about their lives and to see what light that 
sheds on our ways of thinking about our lives. His Confucius sees "the flowering 
of humanity in the ceremonial acts ofmen."119 This is, if you like, a Chinese ethic 
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of character, for whose adherents it is both a duty and an honor to become the 
sort of person who wants to continue the way of the ancestors. This sort of person 
needs no fear of human or superhuman sanction or reward to do what needs to be 
done. 120 
Fingarette's engaged, sympathetic rereading is only the first step in finding our 
feet in comparative ethics. In the last century the flowering of social anthropology 
made it progressively easier to grasp how what might seem entirely alien to the 
foreign visitor could be second nature to the locals. Ethnographic classics by E. E. 
Evans-Pritchard, Godfrey Lienhardt, and others allowed the sympathetic reader 
to feel, if not exactly at home, an honored guest in some very alien environments. 121 
But Mary Douglas may have done more than anyone to shake the modem 
psychologism that makes it easy to think other cultures are undeveloped versions 
of our own. 122 
By using her fieldwork among the Lele of the Kasai to generate an alternative 
reading of the abominations of Leviticus she highlighted the importance of social 
norms and categories in shaping perception. 123 She made it impossible to read 
cavalier dismissals of ritual practice like those of Zaehner as anything other than 
the product ofblinkered parochialism. Later works trained the anthropological lens 
on our own classificatory practices, suggesting that what appear to us to be natural 
and unreflective responses to our environs are themselves products of the languages 
and habits we're trained into from birth. 124 
At the same time Douglas was developing a nuanced, fieldwork savvy version 
of Durkheim, Clifford Geertz was doing much the same for Max Weber. In his 
early essays, Geertz saw himself as working on "a kind of prototheory ... of a more 
adequate analytic framework. " 125 By 1967, he had begun to worry less about social 
theory and more about constructing perspicuous narratives that brought out 
the workings of the different societies he observed. In his Terry Lectures, Geertz 
"attempted to lay out a general framework for the comparative analysis of religion 
and to apply it to a study of the development of a supposedly single creed." 126 
While not averse to the Durkheimian approach ofDouglas,127 Geertz sees Weber 
as providing a more subtle entry into the complications introduced by· change 
over time. To take the most famous of Weber's case studies, the Reformed 
asceticism of Calvin's Geneva was embraced as an ideal by followers in Holland, 
Scotland, and England. That asceticism was popularized in English by Bunyan's 
Pilgrim's Progress, which Weber describes as "by far the most widely read book 
of the whole Puritan literature."128 
In less than a hundred years, Benjamin Franklin, the son of one of Bunyan's 
Puritan contemporaries, would be perpetrating hoaxes, counselling revolutionaries, 
and giving canonical expression to an American ethic of capitalist thrift. Nothing, 
it would seem, could be further from the ethos of Pilgrim's Progress than Franklin's 
utilitarian deism. Yet, Weber argues, the ideas of Calvin and Bunyan held within 
themselves the seeds of "present-day capitalism ... into which the individual is 
born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an unalterable 
order of things in which he must live."129 Regardless of its adequacy as history, 
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what impresses Geertz is Weber's ability to link ideas to social change, which then 
produces new ideas. Because human beings are constantly attempting to figure out 
what's going on around them, ideas are constantly being interpreted, invented, and 
rearranged in response to the "problem ofmeaning."130 
The 1970s found Geertz hoping "to draw large conclusions from small, but 
very densely textured facts; to support broad assertions about the role of culture 
in the construction of collective life by engaging them exactly with complex 
specifics."131 By the time Geertz delivered the Storrs Lectures in 1981, his quick 
term for these complex specifics had become "local knowledge." "Law," he writes, 
"is local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, 
but as to accent- vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to ver-
nacular imaginings of what can."132 Learning the language of legal judgment is 
as much a matter of triangulation as it is for the language of perception. Any theory 
oflaw, if meant to account for how people in different times and places go about 
enforcing their demands on each other and solve, or resolve, matters in dispute, 
would have to be so general as to be of very little descriptive use. Those trained 
up in one or more ofthe schools oflslamic law, Shari'a, may have serious doubts 
about the procedures of someone trained up in Indic law, with "its animating 
idea, dharma." 133 Both could easily be flumoxed by people discussing adat, a word 
of Arabic origins, meaning something like "custom," in an unnamed Balinese 
village in 1958.134 
Geertz tells the story of Regreg and his lost wife to put on display the ways 
that wrinkles in one system cannot easily be ironed out by another. Regreg's kin-
group was too weak to force his wife's abductor/boyfriend to return her. When he 
bucked the system of adat, apparently in a fit of peek, Regreg was shunned, left 
to wander "homeless, about the streets and courtyards of the village like a ghost, 
or more exactly like a dog." 135 When "the highest ranking traditional king on Bali, 
who was also, under the arrangements in effect at the time, the regional head of 
the new Republican government, came to beg Regreg's case,"136 the local council 
refused to allow Regreg back. The new law was lovely, but not applicable. This 
local judgment, Geertz wants to insist, reflects its own "legal sensibility: one with 
form, personality, bite, and, even without the aid of law schools, jurisconsults, 
restatements, journals, or landmark decisions, a firm, developed, almost willful 
awareness ofitself."137 The moral ofGeertz's effort "to render anomalous things 
in not too anomalous words"138 is that we have no choice but to locate our own 
traditions and institutions among the various historically, politically, accidentally 
shaped alternatives. To attempt to wish this fact away "in a haze of forceless 
generalities and false comforts" is neither particularly scientific or much help in 
imagining "principled lives we can practicably lead."139 
For those of us who stay fairly close to home, Geertz can agree with Fingarette 
that "precisely because we of the West are so deeply immersed in a world conceived 
in just such terms" as those found in the tradition that runs from the Greeks, through 
the Christians, to contemporary moral theory, "it is profitable for us to see the world 
in quite another way."140 Geertz's critique of legal, and other, theorists intersects 
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Fingarette's critique of Anglo-American moral theorists. When, in the essays that 
make up his most recent collection, Geertz describes himself as an "anti anti-
relativist" it is not because he thinks anything goes, but because "looking into 
dragons, not domesticating or abominating them, nor drowning them in vats of 
theory, is what anthropology has been all about."141 Translated into ethics and 
politics, this amounts to an argument: 
that political theory is not, or anyway ought not to be, intensely generalized 
reflection on intensely generalized matters, an imagining of architec-
tures in which no one could live, but should be, rather, an intellectual 
engagement, mobile, exact, and realistic, with present problems. 142 
This is, in a nutshell, what reflection on the purposes and limits of war has always 
been, East and West. 
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